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COPYRIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: 
SAVING FREE SPEECH FROM ADVANCING LEGISLATION 
 
Amanda Beshears Cook* 
 
The Supreme Court has expressly recognized the possibility of a First Amendment 
defense to copyright infringement claims, but it has never actually found such a defense to apply 
to a case before it. And nearly every year, Congress enacts or attempts to enact more legislation 
that restricts speech under the banner of the copyright clause. The problem is that the natural 
right of free speech is being depleted by the legislatively granted right of intellectual property, 
putting both individual liberty and the public good at risk. Congress and the courts both must 
begin to acknowledge that in the common law country of the United States, natural rights such 
as free speech should take rank over congressionally granted rights. Scholars have been trying 
to call attention to this conflict since the Copyright Act became effective, but it is important to 
focus on the very basis of the conflict: the difference in theories of intellectual property law 
between common law and civil countries. 
 
This article approaches this subject with a comprehensive, yet concise, method. It walks 
the reader through several stages of the development of current copyright law, taking a very 
close look at fair use doctrine, the problems of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and how 
other advancements in Congressional legislation are historically framed by our Constitution. 
Next, it examines the historical purposes of these two conflicting Constitutional clauses. And 
ultimately, the article provides recommendations for courts, developed from viewing these 
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Introduction 
"Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech"
1
 
"The Congress shall have Power To...promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors...the exclusive Right to their respective Writings..."
2
 
 In one clause, the Constitution expressly grants Congress the right to limit speech by 
forbidding others to use copyrighted material. In the other, it forbids Congress from limiting 
speech. Scholars have insisted these clauses represent an apparent conflict for some time.  
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that a First Amendment defense to copyright 
infringement may exist in theory, such a defense has never been recognized by the Supreme 
Court.  
   
It is possible to reconcile this conflict when these clauses are construed to work together 
for the same purpose. The most well documented policy behind both clauses is to encourage the 
dissemination of information in order to serve the public good.
3
 But the Supreme Court has only 
acknowledged this policy in dicta without an express application, and Congress seems to have 
forgotten it altogether,
4





 The Supreme Court has expressly recognized the possibility of a First Amendment 
defense to copyright infringement claims,
6
 but it has never actually found such a defense to apply 
to a case before it. And nearly every year, Congress enacts or attempts to enact more legislation 
that restricts speech under the banner of the copyright clause. But every constitutional challenge 
to this legislation thus far has met with the same Supreme Court ruling: that the 'traditional 
contours' of copyright law have not been disturbed, and therefore the built-in free speech 




 These 'traditional contours' that accommodate the First Amendment are usually cited as 
the two main exceptions to copyright infringement: 'fair use' and the 'definitional balance'. 'Fair 
use' defenses to copyright infringement claims allow defendants to assert that their repetition of 
another's copyrighted work was done in parody, for a non-commercial or educational use, or for 
another exception permitted by the court.
8
 Courts rely on 'fair use' doctrine to determine, on a 
case-by-case basis, whether an accused infringer should be liable for damages. The 'definitional 
balance' exception prevents the copyright of ideas and facts. In traditional forms of intellectual 
                                                          
1
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2
 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 8. 
3
 See Craig W. Dallon, The Problem With Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the 




 David L. Lange, Risa J. Weaver & Shiveh Roxana Reed, Golan v. Holder: Copyright in the Image of the First 
Amendment, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 83, 86-87 (2011). 
6
 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
7
 See Harper & Row Publishers v. The Nation Enterprises, Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985), Edlred 537 U.S. at 186, 
222 (2003), and Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
8
 17 U.S.C.A. §§107-115 (2010). 
property, such as film, television, and print, these built-in protections of the Copyright Act of 
1976, however muddy their application, generally protect speech from the abuse of private 
monopolies (with some exceptions).  
 
 But the landscape of intellectual property has rapidly changed over the past two decades. 
With the advent of the Internet people have changed the way they share information and 
consume intellectual property. With these new developments, it has become easier for people 
around the world to misappropriate protected material.
9
 The sheer volume of piracy of 
intellectual property has become difficult to regulate. And Congress, goaded by new 
developments in foreign intellectual property agreements, is scrambling to enact legislation that 
would secure the millions (and some cite billions) of dollars in revenue that is lost every year due 




 Increasingly, this expansive protection of private property rights has come at the expense 
of free expression, through modern interpretation of copyright doctrine and recent legislative 
implementation of certain international agreements. Conflict exists between theories of 
intellectual property law in common law and civil law countries, which is problematic when the 
U.S. is required to comply with international agreements.
11
 Civil law countries view intellectual 
property rights as natural rights, and even grant 'moral' rights to copyright holders. By contrast, 
common law countries, such as the United States, view intellectual property rights as only means 




The purposeful disregard of this inherent conflict is beginning to erode the right of public 
dissemination of information, in favor of private property rights.
13
 The danger caused by this 
erosion is that it creates private monopolies over information and unconstitutionally 'chills' 
expression. This frustrates the democratic, public benefit purposes of the original constitutional 
clauses. 
 
 It is important to recognize that the Internet and social media have recently fueled 
revolutions both in the music industry
14
 and in the Middle East.
15
 And neither recent legislation 
nor current interpretive doctrine of the Copyright Act provides adequate protection of First 
Amendment principles on the web.
16
  The Internet is "one of the greatest tools of freedom in the 
                                                          
9
 Internet Commerce Promotion and Protection: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition 
and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4-5 (April 7, 2011) (statement of Floyd Abrams, 




 See David L. Lange et al. supra note 5, at 86-87. 
12
 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh 1905), available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html 
13
 Craig W. Dallon, The Problem With Congress and Copyright law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public 
Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365,425 (2004). 
14
 Interview by Claire Suddath with Greg Kot, author and music critic: How the Internet Changed Music (May 21, 
2009), available at: http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1900054,00.html 
15
Kody Gerkin, World of Click: Social Networking and the Arab Spring Revolutions (2011), available at 
http://bad.eserver.org/issues/2011/Word-of-Click.html 
16
 Dallon supra note 12, at 454. 
history of the world",
17
 and freedom of expression must be better protected on the Internet to 
further the role of democracy both internationally and in the United States.  
 
 This article is designed to provide an overview of how the legislature and the courts have 
historically managed the conflict between the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment. It will 
also show how the goal of serving the public good through dissemination of information is  
slowly eroding in favor of protecting private property rights. And finally, it will critique new 
legislation and recent court decisions for not sufficiently protecting the First Amendment right to 
free speech against copyright law.  
 
 Part I examines the doctrines of 'fair use' and 'definitional balance'. Part II explores the 
evolution of Supreme Court holdings that consider these somewhat flawed doctrines as sufficient 
protection for free speech against copyright law. Part III reviews enacted and proposed copyright 
legislation since the rise of the digital age, discussing the manner in which Congress advances 
private rights at the expense of free speech and why this advancement is incongruent with the 
common law purposes of copyright law and freedom of expression. Part IV will critique the 
constitutionality of some of this recent federal legislation. And finally, Part V will recommend 
new judicial standards based on proper constitutional policy. 
I. Understanding the Context of the Constitutional Conflict: The 'Traditional Contours' 
of First Amendment Problems in Copyright Law 
In keeping with its goal of serving the public good, built into the Copyright Act of 1976 
are two major exceptions intended to accommodate the First Amendment, 'definitional balance' 
(also referred to as the idea/expression dichotomy), and 'fair use' doctrine.  The Supreme Court 
has used both of these protections to avoid a more difficult inquiry into whether the unauthorized 
use of a work should be protected by the First Amendment.
18
 Both of these doctrines have their 
problems, and may not be as protective of First Amendment principles as some suggest.
19 
Nevertheless, these doctrines are what the Court refers to when it speaks of 'traditional contours' 
of Copyright law. And they have thus far been held sufficient protections of expression when 
free speech is asserted as a defense to infringement, or when new copyright legislation is 
attacked on First Amendment grounds.
20
 
A. Tipping the Scales with the Definitional Balance 
The idea/expression (or fact/expression) dichotomy is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), 
which states: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to 
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
                                                          
17
 See Floyd Abrams supra at note 9, and see Marvin Ammori, First Amendment Architecture, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1, 
44 (2012). 
18
 See Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003), and Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
19
 Travis J. Denneson, The Definitional Imbalance Between Copyright and the First Amendment, 30 W. MITCH. L. 
REV. 895 (2004). 
20
 See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890-891. 
work."
21
 This is meant to encourage the dissemination of ideas, allowing an idea or factual 
information to flow freely from one author to another, and from authors to consumers of works.
22 
By preserving ideas and facts for the public domain, copyright law seeks to avoid conflict with 
the First Amendment and serve the public good.  
The Supreme Court has used the idea/expression dichotomy to avoid determinations of 
whether certain First Amendment rights to free speech should outweigh the property interests of 
copyright holders. In the first case where the Supreme Court addressed this conflict, it quoted the 
Second Circuit, saying: "copyright's idea/expression dichotomy 'strike[s] a definitional balance 
between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts 
while still protecting an author's expression.'”
23
 This is what has since become known as the 
'definitional balance' approach to deciding matters of copyright infringement, 'punting' the 
speech/property conflict in favor of reaching a determination based solely upon the built-in 
protections of the Copyright Act.
24
  
There is one very fundamental reason that the idea/expression dichotomy does not 
sufficiently protect First Amendment rights. Sometimes an idea can be so intertwined with the 
expression of that idea that the two become inseparable.
25
 The particular work in such an 
instance should not be protectable.
26
 This phenomenon has been referred to as 'merger'.
27
 In this 
case, the work is not capable of attaining copyright protection.
28
  “The merger doctrine reflects 
the principle that where the expression is essential to the statement of the idea, or where there is 




Classifying a work as either 'merged' or subject to the 'definitional balance' is not an easy 
decision. The difficulty of distinguishing an idea from its expressive form can be made with 
certain visual images.
30
 The distinction between idea and expression is more difficult to make in 
                                                          
21
 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (2012), accord Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 
340, 350 (1991). 
22
 Janice E. Oaks, Copyright and the First Amendment: Where Lies the Public Interest?, 59 TUL. L. REV. 135, 137 
(1984). 
23
 Harper & Row Publishers v. The Nation Enterprises, Inc.(quoting XXXX), 471 U.S. 539, 556. 
24
 Travis J. Denneson, The Definitional Imbalance Between Copyright and the First Amendment, 30 W. MITCH. L. 
REV. 895 (2004). 
25
 Id.  
26
 Id, and accord Rodney A. Smolla, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, A TREATISE ON THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT § 21:8, (2008). 
27
 Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 481 (March 
2010). 
28
 Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir.1967), accord Melville B. Nimmer and David 
Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[B][3] (2007). 
29
 Woods v. Resnick, 725 F. Supp. 2d 809, 821 (W.D. Wis. 2010). 
30




 because the image may express the idea in ways that words cannot.
32
  Whether a 
particular visual image is protectable under the merger doctrine is not easily determined.
33
  
For example, in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, the Ninth Circuit held 
that a jewelry company could not enjoin the manufacture of all jewel-encrusted pins that are 
shaped like bees.
34
 This holding seems obvious at first glance, but the reasoning behind it can 
prove problematic when applied in different scenarios, such as when it would be more 
appropriate to apply for a patent than rely on copyright protection. “When the idea and its 
expression are thus inseparable, copying the expression will not be barred, since protecting the 
expression in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the idea upon the copyright owner 
free of the conditions and limitations imposed by the patent law.”
35
 This holding exposes the 
heart of the constitutional conflict. Applying the same reasoning, Professor Nimmer once 
referred to photographs of the My Lai massacre, arguing that they should not be protectable, 
because  "It would be intolerable if the public’s comprehension of the full meaning of My Lai 
could be censored by the copyright owner of the photographs. In this case, the speech interest 




Yet another problem with the 'definitional balance' test is that the First Amendment 
protects non-verbal expression as well as ideas.
37
 For example, there are certain categories of 
protected speech that can be offensive to some members of society, yet the Supreme Court has 







 Non-verbal expression is, therefore, protectable under the First 
Amendment. Because a non-verbal expression may or may not be protected speech, yet another 
layer of difficulty is added to questions of copyright infringement, especially when the line 




When these lines are blurred, as they often are in copyright litigation, a court will often 
favor economic considerations over concerns for freedom of expression.
42
 This apparent bias and 
the difficulties in applying the definitional balance defense both result in the defense rarely being 
used, and even more rarely used successfully.
43
 It has been applied successfully only to works in 
certain specific, and very pragmatic, forms of expression, such as building codes and 
accountancy forms.
44
 The defense is usually unsuccessful when applied to artistic or cultural 
                                                          
31
 Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F.Supp.2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
32
 See Smolla supra note 28 at § 21:8, Denneson supra note 26 at 904, and Tushnet supra note 32 at 692. 
33
 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
34




 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19E.03 (1997). 
37
 See Denneson supra note 26 at 916, citing to Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989), and United 
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1990). 
38
 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989). 
39
 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, (1989). 
40
 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
41




 Andrew B. Hebl, A Heavy Burden: Proper Application of Copyright's Merger and Scenes a Faire Doctrines, 8 
WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 128 (Winter 2007). 
44
 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
works, which arguably contribute more to social discourse than accountancy forms.
45
 Because of 
these unclear distinctions and limited applications, the 'definitional balance' doctrine is 
insufficient to defend First Amendment rights against claims of copyright infringement. 
B. The Muddy Waters of Fair Use 
The ‘fair use’ doctrine also insufficiently protects multitudes of creators. For example, 
visual artists cannot copy another's work, even if using a different medium or if visual elements 
are changed, and sometimes even if no commercial value has been misappropriated from the 
original work.
46 
The reasoning behind this is that allowing even a near-exact copy would 
discourage artists from creating new works and publishing those works for public view. Some 
direct copies of visual works were once held to be non-infringing 'fair use', due to their 
importance to the public interest, but these holdings have been overruled.
47
 Like the 'definitional 
balance' between an idea and its expression, 'fair use' plays a large role in protecting First 




17 U.S.C. § 107 codifies four different 'fair use' factors to use to determine whether an 
author has infringed upon another's copyright, or whether the use is allowable.
49
 These factors 
are: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial  
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted  
work as a whole; and 




 These factors attempt to accommodate the First Amendment by allowing use of another 
creator's work through quotations, for educational purposes, for parody, and generally for non-
commercial use. But the statute is held to call for a case-by-case analysis, which means ad hoc 
decisions are made for each case on what is or is not exactly 'fair use'.
51 
Both the courts and 
Congress have deliberately kept the test for 'fair use' vague. The Committee on the Judiciary 
notes to the 1976 Act state: "... no real definition of the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since 
the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each 
case raising the question must be decided on its own facts."
52
 This case-by-case approach to 
determining copyright infringement invites much litigation over what is or is not fair use.  
 
                                                          
45
 See Id at 142. 
46
 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (N.Y.C.A. 1992) (holding that when the infringing image is in almost all 
elements exactly the same as the original work, intentionally appropriated the commercial value of the original 
work, and cannot be considered parody, the infringing author is still subject to liability). 
47
 Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates 293 F.Supp. 130, 141 (D.C.N.Y. 1968), accord Harper & Row Publishers 
v. The Nation Enterprises, Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
48
 See Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003), Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012), and accord Harper & 
Row Publishers at 558. 
49
 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (2010). 
50
 Id.  
51
 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,  510  U.S. 569, 581 (1994). 
52
 H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 3, 1976). 
 One of the best illustrations of the uncertainty that surrounds the fair use doctrine is the 
application of the 'parody' defense.
53
 In Rogers v. Koons, the Court famously held that while 
parody is a 'fair use' defense, satire is not.
54
 And therefore, in order to claim 'fair use', an artist 
who uses another's work must comment directly on that work, as opposed to commenting on 




 In deciding this seminal case, the court also focused on the commercial nature of the 
appropriation, and the intention of the infringing artist.
56
 The artist, Jeff Koons, copied the image 
of a postcard photograph into a sculpture. He incorporated some surreal elements into his three 
dimensional interpretation, by turning a litter of puppies bright blue and giving them cartoon 
noses, and caricaturing the human subjects' faces.
57
 The Court did not, however, focus at all on 
how much the artist had changed (or, to use the legal term of art, 'transformed') the original 
image, but instead focused on the extent of his intentional use of the copyrighted image, for 




 In another well-known parody case, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
59
 the Court wrestled 
with whether 2LiveCrew had misappropriated Roy Orbison's "Pretty Woman", or whether the 
group's use of Mr. Orbison's famous bass line and lyric constituted fair use.
60
 The court held that 
not all commercial appropriation can be considered infringement, and that the test was how 
'transformative' the parody is of the original work, as well as how much market value the parody 
directly took from the original.
61





 Parody doctrine illustrates the difficulty of most 'fair use' defenses. The application of § 
107 factors is usually very unpredictable, as demonstrated by these two cases.  Courts look at 
factors such as how much of the work was appropriated, if the copying supplanted the 
commercial value of the work, or whether the new work is 'transformative'.
63
 Sometimes courts 
use the fair use factors to manufacture their own exceptions. As one legal commentator quipped: 
"Unfortunately, the only way to get a definitive answer on whether a particular use is a 'fair use' 




 There are also problems inherent in the parody/satire distinction. The Court reasons that 
the distinction is based on the premise that satire 'stands on its own two feet', and it is therefore 
                                                          
53
 See Michael A. Einhorn, Miss Scarlett's License Done Gone! Parody, Satire and Markets, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 589 (2002). 
54




 Id at 309. 
57
 See the comparative images at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/martin/art_law/image_rights.htm 
58
 Rogers at 309. (There was evidence that he had deliberately removed a copyright symbol from the photograph 
before sending it for a cast mold to be made from the image.) 
59




 Id at 590, 592. 
62
 Id at 594. 
63
 18 AM. JUR. 2d Copyright and Literary Property §§ 78-85 (2010). 
64
 RICHARD STIM, GETTING PERMISSION: HOW TO LICENSE AND CLEAR COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS ONLINE AND OFF, 
(Oct. 2010) reprinted in part at: http://fairuse.stanford.edu/Copyright_and_Fair_Use_Overview/chapter9/9-b.html 
unnecessary to appropriate someone else's material to satirize a general social concern.
65
  But 
satire has just as much social value, if not more, than parody.
66
 Also, there is no difference in the 
economic difficulty of obtaining a license for either type of commentary.
67
 And arguably, if there 
were no distinction recognized by the Court between parody and satire, the sculpture at issue in 
Rogers v. Koons could very well have withstood the test of Acuff-Rose. The sculpture did not 
supplant the market value of the postcard, and it was 'transformative' of the postcard in style and 
meaning, as well as medium. 
C. The Dangerous Chill of Subjective Safe Harbors 
 Both the fair use doctrine and the test for definitional balance are murky and subjective.  
Because these are difficult tests to apply, and because each allegation must be decided on a case-
by-case basis, the legal framework creates much uncertainty over the outcome of litigation for 
social satirists, and creators of all mediums of expression. Moreover, when these doctrines are 
imported to the online world, compilation artists, DJs, fan club presidents, social satirists and 
other comedians, meme creators, remix artists, collage artists, amateur musicians, politicians, 
political pundits and commentators, journalists, clip show hosts, bloggers, proud mothers of 
dancing toddlers, and just about any other citizen who uses the Internet for business, pleasure, or 
social communication experience a chilling of their natural, Constitutional rights by intellectual 
property monopolies.  
  
 This murkiness also prevents the dissemination of information for educational as well as 
social purposes. The Visual Resources Association went so far as to publish a best practice 
manual to instruct educators and librarians on the most common instances of fair use issues.
68
 In 
it, the association succinctly describes the issues: 
 
"Uncertainty surrounding the ability to rely on fair use had a tangible negative impact  
on teaching, research, and study: for example, some faculty and students do not  
have access to the images they need for pedagogical purpose because the images  
cannot be licensed and because these individuals are unsure of the boundaries of  
fair use. In other instances, individual institutions are uncertain about their  
ability legally to preserve image collections and to migrate them to new formats.  
In still other cases, some graduate students are tailoring their doctoral dissertation  




 The confusion created by unclear legal standards causes a 'chilling effect' on expression, 
due to the costs and uncertainty of litigation.
70 
And the 'chill' restricts expression just as much as 
a content-based prior restraint.
71
 The 'chill' of copyright has been thus far tolerated because it has 
                                                          
65
 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d at 309. 
66
 Michael A. Einhorn, Miss Scarlett's License Done Gone! Parody, Satire and Markets, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 




VISUAL RESOURCES ASSOCIATION: STATEMENT ON THE FAIR USE OF IMAGES FOR TEACHING, RESEARCH, AND 
STUDY, (2011)  available at http://www.vraweb.org/organization/pdf/VRAFairUseGuidelinesFinal.pdf 
69
 Id at 2. 
70
 See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect, 58 BOSTON U. L. 
REV. 685 (1978). 
71
See id. 
been seen as justifiable, necessary to advance dissemination of works by encouraging their 
creation. But when the costs of creation and dissemination are low, such as with new digital 
media, the rationale behind these traditional rules becomes less and less sound.  
 
 Therefore, the problems with 'definitional balance' and 'fair use' grow even more poignant 
when transferred to a digital forum. And when viewed in the context of the legal theory behind 
the Copyright Clause, namely protecting the natural right of free expression and the public right 
to dissemination, versus the Congressionally granted right of intellectual property ownership, the 
favor shown to economic interests in the application of these doctrines is unacceptable. This 
theme is repeated throughout legislative and doctrinal copyright law. 
II. Supreme Court Interpretation of the Adequacy of Built-In First Amendment 
Protections: Applying the "Traditional Contours" of Copyright law 
 The Supreme Court decisions in copyright cases continue to use these two built-in 
statutory protections as the only free speech accommodations to copyright law, despite their 
inadequacies.
72 
This results in an erosion of free expression in favor of private property rights, 
especially when coupled with the enactment of progressively aggressive copyright legislation. In 
litigation over 'fair use' issues, the Supreme Court still regularly mentions the purpose of 
promoting the public good, or serving the 'public interest' by incentivizing the dissemination of 
information.
73 
But with each advancing issue, the Court has yet to find the public good of free 
speech to outweigh private rights in intellectual property.
74 
Certainly, many decisions on the 
validity of a copyright have been informed by First Amendment values.
75 
However, no copyright 
infringement has ever been expressly held defensible by the Court on First Amendment grounds. 
And no copyright legislation has ever been held unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 
Even the decisions that have expressly applied a ‘public interest’ analysis under ‘fair use’ 
doctrine have been overruled by the Supreme Court.
76  
 
 One famous case, Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., initiated a line of 
cases in the Second Circuit that cited the 'public good' or 'public benefit' as playing a role in 
determining the purpose and character of use under the first § 107 factor. 
77 
The court held that 
information appropriated by an unauthorized biographer, from magazine articles written about 
Howard Hughes, was not subject to a preliminary injunction. The court considered the 'public 
interest' in the life of a 'public figure' to be of too high of importance to enjoin publication.  
 
 Soon thereafter, in a case where an artist copied film stills of the Kennedy assassination 
into sketches, the court held that the event was of such great 'public interest' that the artist had the 
                                                          
72
 See Edlred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003), accord Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
73
 Id, see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975), Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), and Golan at 888-890 (holding that both dissemination and creation are 




 Michael D. Birnhack, "Freedom of Speech" from NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT. §19E. 
76
 Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985). 
77
 366 F.2d 303 (2 Cir. 1966). 
right to use the images.  It also considered that he needed the images to explain his theories on 
how the assassination was carried out, as there was no other way to do so.
78  
 
The court found that in such a case the public good would be greater served by allowing 
dissemination of the stills.
79
  It weighed the 'public interest' against the minimal commercial 
value of the appropriated video.
80
 Finding in favor of the defendant, it decided there was greater 




 Up until the mid-1980's, the Second Circuit continued to use this 'public interest' 
balancing test under the 'purpose and character' factor of §107 for certain infringement 
decisions.
82
 The courts weighed the 'public interest' of an infringing work against the lost 
commercial value of the appropriated material, in order to discern which one was in greater need 
of protection.
83
 In other words, the courts began inquiring , under the first factor of § 107, 
whether the 'purpose and character' of an infringing work was to serve the 'public interest'.
84
 And 




 In time, however, the Supreme Court put an end to such an inquiry. In the landmark case 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Second Circuit held that the 'public 
interest' was so important in this particular case that no infringement could be found.
86
 The case 
involved a copy of the unpublished autobiography of President Gerald Ford, which was 
somehow misappropriated by a journalist, whose employer published verbatim quotes from the 
manuscript, thereby destroying its commercial value.
87
 On appeal, however, the Supreme Court 
disagreed with the Second Circuit about the importance of the 'public interest' in 'fair use' 
doctrine, or more specifically, of the importance of works regarding a 'public figure'.
88
 In an 
opinion delivered by Justice O'Connor, the Court reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit 




 The Court used examples of other 'fair use' exemptions to copyright, holding these 
exemptions sufficient to protect the 'public interest' without a special exception.
90
 The court 
specifically noted the idea/expression dichotomy, as well as the express statutory exemption for 
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 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983). 
87






 Id at  557-558. 
government works.
91
 It also noted that the issue at hand was related to a government worker no 




 Also, the Court specifically rejected the idea of a 'public interest' factor under 'fair use', 
stating, "It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to accord lesser rights in those 
works that are of greatest importance to the public. Such a notion ignores the major premise of 
copyright and injures author and public alike."
93
 Thus, the Court rationalized away First 
Amendment concerns, based on the fear that overprotecting First Amendment rights against 




 In the next section of the opinion, Justice O'Connor applied the 'fair use' defense to the 
printing of substantial verbatim quotations from President Ford's book.
95
 The court noted that not 
only was the publisher's use of the copyrighted material commercial, but that the use had the 
intended purpose of supplanting the commercial use of the copyright holder.
96
 Finding no other 




In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, quoted 
the report made by the 60th Congress when it enacted the Copyright Act of 1909, which echoed 
the words of Thomas Jefferson: “The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the 
terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings ... 
but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science and 
useful arts will be promoted..."
98
 Notably, these dissenters recognized free speech as a natural 





Therefore, the Supreme Court, in 1985, still sought to serve the public good through 
copyright, even if it declined to recognize an explicit 'public interest' exception. But many lower 
courts subsequently misread the Harper opinion to extend a broad ban on First Amendment 
objections to copyright infringement claims.
100
 The Court ended this trend in Eldred v. Ashcroft. 
 




 Id, and see 17 U.S.C.A. § 111. 
93
 Id at 559.  
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 Harper & Row Publishers, 471 U.S. at 562. 
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98
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(Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh 1905), available at http://press-
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99
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100
 New Era Publications Intern. v. Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576 (1989) (holding that fair use 
accommodates all First Amendment claims to copyright infringement), Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications 
Intern., 778 F.Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that 'fair use' analyses incorporates First Amendment defense), 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F.Supp. 1526, (C.D.Cal. 1985) (holding that the First 
Amendment is not a defense to copyright infringement), and Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 
F.Supp. 554, (D.C.D.C. 1981) (holding the 'definitional balance' to accommodate First Amendment concerns). 
In the late 1990's, group of artists and educators questioned the constitutionality of the 
Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) as a restriction on First Amendment 
rights.
101
 This legislation extended the terms of both new and existing copyrights by twenty 
years.
102
 The petitioners argued that extending the copyright terms for works already scheduled 
to enter the public domain violated their constitutional right to use those already existing 
works.
103
 They asked the Court to apply the intermediate scrutiny of content-neutral prior 




The United States District Court for the District of Columbia had earlier rejected the 
petitioners' First Amendment claims, and held that the First Amendment was categorically never 
a defense to copyright infringement.
105
 The lower court stated "plaintiffs lack any cognizable 
First Amendment right to exploit the copyrighted works of others." This followed precedent 
from United Video v. F.C.C.,
106
 in which the district court held, "Although there is some tension 
between the Constitution's copyright clause and the First Amendment, the familiar 
idea/expression dichotomy of copyright law, under which ideas are free but their particular 





 Although the Supreme Court in Eldred agreed with the D.C. Circuit in result,
108
 it also 
explicitly overruled the lower court's holding that the First Amendment could never be a defense 
to a copyright infringement claim.
109
 Justice Ginsberg, writing for seven of the nine Justices, 
explained at the very end of the majority opinion: "We recognize that the D.C. Circuit spoke too 
broadly when it declared copyrights “categorically immune from challenges under the First 
Amendment.” [citation omitted]. But when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the 




 Therefore, in 2003, although the Supreme Court held that 'definitional balance' and 'fair 
use' were thus far adequate accommodations of First Amendment speech, it left the door open for 
further constitutional challenges to forthcoming copyright legislation in cases where Congress 
might overstep the bounds of the 'traditional contours'.
111
 The Court continues to hold that there 
is no per se ban on First Amendment challenges to copyright, but still has never decided a case in 
which the First Amendment prevailed. And no act of Congress has yet been held to 
unconstitutionally alter the 'traditional contours' of copyright. 
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 Id at 221. 
111
 Id. 
 The Court heard the next Constitutional challenge to a subsequent copyright extension in 
2011, under a similar pattern as Edlred, in Golan v. Holder.
112
 The petitioners were again 
scholars and artists, who this time protested the removal of certain works from the public 
domain.
113
 A new extension enacted by Congress in order to bring United States’ copyright law 
into compliance with the Berne Convention of 1886, as required by the 1994 Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), re-instated copyright protection 




 The Supreme Court found this extension, known as the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
§ 514 (URAA), constitutional in a January 18, 2012 decision.
115
 The Court hardly seemed to 
consider the First Amendment issue, stating once again that the 'definitional balance' and 'fair 
use' analyses were sufficient protection for any work that had gained or re-gained copyright 
protection from the new legislation.
116
 The court also held that bringing copyright law into 
compliance with international agreements was rationally related to the dissemination of 




Thus, although the Supreme Court vaguely acknowledges that there may be some First 
Amendment limitations on copyright, it has yet to find those limitations. Once again, the Court 
left the door open for more copyright litigation, but declined to indicate when it might be shut. 
And again, content users from all walks of life are left twisting in the winds of uncertainty due to 
a lack of focus on the underlying natural rights of free expression and public dissemination.  
III. The Foreign Policy-Driven Congressional Progression of the 
Private Property Regime 
 The last two cases discussed, Eldred and Golan,  resulted from new copyright legislation 
passed to implement foreign treaties with the goal of conforming copyright legislation at the 
international level.118 The problems inherent in this implementation stem from different 
conceptions of what copyright laws are meant to accomplish. In civil law countries, copyright 
laws were enacted to protect what are viewed as natural property rights, inherent to the creator of 
the property.119 But in common law countries such as the United States, copyright laws were 
originally meant to serve the public by disseminating information.120 So it is no wonder that 
forcing conformity between these disparate systems has brought some turmoil.  
A. Foreign Policy and Intellectual Property Protection Treaties 
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 The CTEA and the URAA are not the only recent Congressional acts that advance private 
property rights at the expense of free speech. The Berne Convention of 1886 was the first 
international agreement to regulate trade in intellectual property between member countries.
121 
The United States did not join the Berne Convention initially because the treaty was so much 




 For example, the Berne Convention protected 'moral rights', or rights of an artist to 
control the 'integrity' of her work.
123
 Also, works in the United States once required registration 
to gain protection, as works under the Berne Convention did not. And in the United States 
authors once had to actively renew their copyright, while under European law, copyright owners 
did not.
124
 But in 1988, Congress passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act, and began 




 The next international agreement resulted in formation of the World Trade Organization, 
and incorporated Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention as the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).
126 
This was the international agreement under 
which the CTEA was passed, the statute at issue in Golan.
127
 But this was not the last 
advancement of intellectual property rights in the United States in the past fifteen or twenty 
years. 
 Next came an international agreement reached by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization.
128
 Two treaties were signed by the organization in 1996, the Copyright Treaty and 
the Performances and Phonograms Treaty.
129 
And perhaps most notoriously, one of the most 
troubling Congressional copyright advancements to date, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA), was enacted because of these treaties.
130 
This act has been in place long enough for the 
problems inherent in its procedural implementations to come to light, and these problems are 
discussed in more detail below.  
 
 The latest international agreement, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement,
131
 was 
signed by the United States in October of 2011
.132
 ACTA requires member countries to impose 
both fines and imprisonment for not only copying a work, but also "aiding and abetting" a 
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What kind of legislation Congress will attempt to pass to comply with this 
international agreement is yet to be seen. But many critics agree that the ACTA provisions "are 




 Criminalization of what has thus far been civil infringement is one concern of free speech 
proponents.
135 
Another feared result is the implementation of 'graduated response', or 'three 
strikes' rules.
136 
These provisions in the treaty encouraged Internet service providers (ISPs) to 
eliminate Internet access to the websites of 'repeat infringers' altogether, which would 
permanently silence voices on the web without any adjudication.
137
 The express provisions of 
these politically dangerous laws have been removed from the final version of the treaty, but the 




 By studying the chronology of these international agreements, one can see the 
progression of the protection of private intellectual property rights, and in contrast, the erosion of 
free speech. Since the United States became a member of the Berne Convention in 1988, each 
new treaty has brought with it more international obligations to prevent infringement at the 
expense of free expression. Like the use of the 'traditional contours’ in the Supreme Court, this 
development illustrates the erosion of the natural right of free speech and the progression of the 
private property regime at the expense of public dissemination. The following section looks at 
some provisions adopted to comply with these international agreements in the United States, and 
how they directly erode public rights to information and free speech.  
B. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
 The DMCA, approved by Congress in 1998, is as yet the boldest attempt of the United 
States Congress to curtail Internet piracy of intellectual property.
139 
The stated purpose of the act 
was to... "provide certainty for copyright owners and Internet service providers with respect to 
copyright infringement liability online."
140 
The DMCA implemented a new, self-help procedure 
for copyright owners to exercise control over their intellectual property.  And this procedure 
creates problems when it is abused by copyright holders who, for political purposes or purposes 
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 The DMCA takedown procedure is somewhat simple, and at first glance this can be 
appealing. A copyright owner, having found an unlicensed bit of her intellectual property posted 
on a host website (or linked by a search engine), needs only to contact the intermediary site or 
engine and request the material be removed.
142 
An intermediary is any site that provides data 
hosting, webhosting, serves as an interface between third parties for the exchange of goods, or 
serves in any way to facilitate the sharing of information between users.
143
 Once the intermediary 
receives the notification through its 'designated DMCA agent', it can escape liability for any 
contributory infringement if it expediently removes the offending material.
144 
Unfortunately, the 




 In her article on the 'chilling effects' of the DMCA, Wendy Seltzer recounts an event that 
directly illuminates the effect of the DMCA takedown procedure on the purposes of the First 
Amendment.
146 
During the 2008 presidential election, Senator John McCain's campaign posted 
several videos to YouTube. These campaign videos used clips from particular television shows 
to illustrate certain political issues.
147
 Television networks that owned the rights to these clips 




 The allegedly offending material was down for several weeks just prior to Election 
Day.
149 
"If there was ever a clear case of non-infringing fair use -- speech protected by the First 
Amendment -- this should have been it: a political candidate, seeking to engage in public 
multimedia debate...".
150
 These abusers of the DMCA process were capable of successfully 
silencing campaign speech right at its most critical moment. Though this particular medium of 
communication might not have been envisioned by our forefathers, this was exactly the type of 
communication they sought to protect with the United States Constitution. 
 
 This abuse was a problem that Congress anticipated and attempted to prevent, however 
with very limited success. Another provision in the DMCA provides for counter-notices, by 
which an accused user whose use is not infringing can notify the intermediary and have his 
content re-posted.
151
 It also provides that the victim of a notice that has been filed by 
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 Id at 173. 
151
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152
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 But an action for misrepresentation can only be successful if it meets an incredibly high 
burden of proof. The accused infringer must prove that the copyright owner made a 'knowing 
material misrepresentation' as to whether s/he owned the copyright or actually knew that the 
plaintiff's posted material was not infringing.
153 
This means that for a finding of 'bad faith' 
misrepresentation, a plaintiff (the accused infringer) must show that the defendant (the copyright 
holder) knew or should have known that the plaintiff's use of the defendant's intellectual property 
was 'fair'.
154 
In other words, the plaintiff (accused infringer) must divine the application of the 
law as well as the defendant's (copyright holder's) intentions. And as discussed in Part I(B), 
actually knowing this before a federal court renders a decision is nearly impossible.  
 
 This is a high hurdle of proof, and many cases have held that the plaintiff (alleged 
infringer) must prove lack of a good faith belief on the part of the DMCA claimant.
155
 One of the 
only successful claims involved a mother who posted a video of her toddler dancing to Prince's 
"Let's Go Crazy."
156 
Prince is notoriously outspoken against anyone using his material without 
permission, even if a court would find it fair use.
157 
The woman won her claim against Prince's 
label, Universal Music, on proof that the company was sophisticated enough to have known the 




 But this one example of victory over a "knowing material misrepresentation" in a DMCA 
takedown notice is a very rare exception to the usual speech-chilling rule.
159
 The financial 
incentives created by the DMCA distort the procedure of copyright litigation at the expense of 
free expression. The financial reward for winning these cases is very small compared to the costs 





 Additionally, the abnormal incentives created by the DMCA flip the responsibilities of 
copyright holder and infringer.
161
 Instead of the copyright holder having to sue the re-posting 
user, the user will have to sue the copyright holder in order to speak freely.
162
 Thus, state-granted 
intellectual property rights have perversely become a bulwark against the natural rights of free 
expression and public dissemination. Surely this was not the intention of the framers of the 
Constitution. 
 
 Further, an intermediary who does not expediently remove infringing material can be 
liable for contributory infringement under the Copyright Act, and has very little incentive to 
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 See Seltzer supra note 142 at 210-217 (citing a lengthy list of incidents of DMCA abuses, from the truly 
frightening to the somewhat amusing). 
160
 Id at 178. 
161
 Id at 210-217. 
162
 Id at 178. 
defend the poster, who is also unlikely to succeed in any subsequent litigation against the 
copyright holder for unwarranted removal.
163 The result is essentially that the government turns 
intermediaries and search engines into de facto federal judges, with a self-serving financial bias 
in favor of findings of infringement. On one side the intermediaries are threatened with 
contributory liability, and on the other side with nothing, so there is no incentive to be fair. This 
skews take-down results in a way that creates a 'chilling effect' on free expression, discouraging 
speech before it is communicated to its intended audience.
164  
 
 One First Amendment challenge to the DMCA has been adjudicated,
165
 but only in regard 
to the speech and non-speech nature of computer code. In Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 
166
 the Southern District of New York held that the DMCA did not violate the First Amendment 
rights of those who posted decoding programs that would allow other Internet users to decrypt 
and manipulate encrypted content.
167 Addressing the anti-trafficking and anti-circumvention 
provisions of the DMCA, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, specifically 
analyzing computer code as speech, computer programs as speech, and addressing the question 




 The Second Circuit held that the computer code and computer programs, as well as the 
decryption code at issue, all constitute speech, and are therefore entitled to some First 
Amendment protection.
169 However, the court also found that the decryption code contained both 
speech and non-speech components, and held that this mixture entitled the code only to 
intermediate scrutiny protection against the DMCA.
170
 The court also found that both provisions 
in question held up under a content-neutral analysis, because they both "serve[d] a substantial 
governmental interest, the interest [was] unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the 





 This was a narrow holding related only to the decoding software and the anti-
circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA. The Second Circuit was very 
cautious of giving any further indication of whether it would uphold or strike down any other 
provisions of the DMCA in relation to other types of speech.
172
 Therefore, a lower court would 
be free to examine the constitutionality of the take-down notice procedure, regardless of this 
holding. And given the conflict between the DMCA and proper constitutional policy, courts 
should take a very close look at this legislation every time they are afforded the opportunity. 
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C. The Avalanche of Legislation 
 Lawmakers and entertainment industry professionals are adamant about the need for even 
more protection for copyright holders from pirates and Internet users.
173
 There is constantly more 
Congressional legislation proposed over digital copyright infringement issues, most recently the 
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA).
174 SOPA and 
PIPA were basically long-arm statutes that allowed the Attorney General to file complaints 
against unknown owners of foreign websites who host or sell infringing material.
175 Under these 
bills, after obtaining summary judgment against a defendant who was unlikely to appear, the 
attorney general could then file for an injunction against any website or search engine that so 
much as linked to the offending site.
176  
 
 Any site failing to comply with the court order would be vulnerable to court sanctions.
177 
This would most certainly cause user-generated content sites to "err on the side of censorship", 
just as they do under the DMCA.
178
  Like the DMCA, this could have caused considerable 
problems for procedural protection of expression, and 'chilled' the speech of a user by any site 
who simply did not want to be part of any litigation.
179  
 
 Another concern was that these statutes would have created 'blacklists' of foreign 
websites that would never be available in the United States. They also allegedly created security 
threats by encouraging domain name system blocking schemes.
180
 If free expression is going to 
be sufficiently protected in the digital age, Congress is needs to remember the purpose of United 




 But instead, Congress has quickly continued passing more and more restrictive legislation 
on speech under the banner of copyright and the pressure of international agreements. There are 
many other examples. The 1990 Visual Rights Act gave artists 'moral rights' over their visual 
works, which before were only available under copyright laws of civil law countries.
182 The 
Criminal Penalties for Copyright Infringement Act of 1992 could send an infringer to prison for 
up to five years for copying material worth more than $2,500.
183 The No Electronic Theft Act 
criminalized 'willful' infringement, even if not for commercial purposes, in direct opposition to 
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the 'traditional contours' of 'fair use' and the 'definitional balance'.
184 In 1996, RICO
185
 liability 
was added to certain copyright infringement claims by passing the Anti-counterfeiting Consumer 
Protection Act.
186
 And criminal sanctions were again increased for different kinds of 
infringement with the Anti-counterfeiting Amendments Act of 2004, the Artists Rights and Theft 





 The PRO-IP Act,
188 which again increased criminal and monetary sanctions, also created 
the Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator.
189
 It also authorizes a court 
to destroy or impound any material if a plaintiff has a reasonable chance of success on a claim.
190
 
All of this legislation, like the DMCA, compounded by the uncertainty of copyright litigation, 
once again significantly limits the expressive rights and incentives of creators of all kinds of 
work, from music, to software, to visual art.
191 And like the courts, Congress is beginning to hold 
government-granted intellectual property rights in higher regard than the natural right of free 
speech. 
 
 Each new piece of legislation is a turn on a ratchet that tightens the lid of copyright down 
on top of free expression.
192
 And any post-hoc attention paid to free speech by a court is usually 
too late, as accused material would already be removed or destroyed, a business or home will 
have already been raided, business assets seized and destroyed, an accused infringer charged and 
possibly held in custody, and therefore the damage to an innocent 'fair-user' irrevocably done.
193
 
The uncertainty of litigation, in combination with possible destruction of the work and criminal 
sanctions, provides little incentive for a creator to take any risk in creating a new work with even 
the slightest reference to his inspiration. Chill winds indeed are blowing from the realm of 
copyright. 
IV. The Shared Purpose of Copyright and the First Amendment 
 The reason for the dissonance in traditional U.S. copyright law and the recent legislation 
being passed under international agreements is more fundamental than many lawmakers seem to 
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recognize. The very basis of the conflict is the differing theories of law between civil law and 
common law countries.  Civil law countries view copyright as a 'natural' right of authorship, 
whereas common law countries view copyright as a means to incentivize works of authorship to 
promote the dissemination of information.
194
 In common law counties, free speech and public 
dissemination of ideas are 'natural rights' more fundamental than the legislatively-granted right 
of intellectual property ownership. 
 
 Therefore, while in civil law countries the bounty of intellectual toil is considered an 
aspect of the natural right of property, in the United States, the ability to own and therefore sell a 
work is meant to be a temporary carrot for the creative voice.
195
  Allowing authors to capitalize 
on their works for a limited period of time is meant to encourage them to disseminate their 
ideas.
196
 In this way Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution, granting 
Congress the power to establish intellectual property rights that do not already exist in a natural 
state, serves the public good, which is one of the shared goals of the Copyright Clause and the 
First Amendment.
197
 The dissemination of information ultimately serves the public, as opposed 
to an individual squirreling information and ideas away for herself, or hoarding them for her own 
economic gain. 
 
 Sometimes it is argued that self-actualization is the goal of the copyright clause, and it is 
therefore more aligned with the purposes of intellectual property laws in civil law countries.
198
 
But self-actualization can also be seen as a means to serve the public good. Some scholars argue 
that this is the best and the highest rationale for freedom of expression.
199
 There seems to be a 
fear that admitting the public goal in both copyright law and First Amendment doctrine would 
somehow endanger all speech that was not political,
200
 but this is surely not the case. Though 
some commentators argue that political speech is the only speech that should be protected, an 
inquiry into what constitutes political speech would be almost impossible.  Take for example, the 
breakthrough film, "Guess Who's Coming to Dinner?,” an expose of racial stereotypes and 
attitudes in 1960's America.
201
 Art imitates life, which imitates art, and one cannot be said to be 




 If these purposes are an "interlocking web" of values, with none being derivative of the 
other,
203
 certainly there is a central thread to this web, and that is the public good. There is no 
other rationale cited so frequently by our founding fathers. Thomas Jefferson wrote a letter to 
Isaac McPherson in which he pondered the Copyright Clause in relation to Freedom of 
Expression.
204
 In this letter, he explained that it is unnatural for an idea to be considered the 
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property of any one person, because "ideas should freely spread from one to another over the 




 In this letter, Jefferson expressed doubt that a system granting monopolies over intangible 
property could encourage public discourse any better than one that does not. However, he chose 
to sit on the patent board in order to develop the law of intellectual property, property which he 
wrote was "given not of natural right, but for the benefit of society..."
206
 So, although Jefferson 
was sometimes doubtful of the usefulness of the Copyright Clause in accomplishing its goal of 
serving the public good, he acquiesced in its use for this purpose. By comparison, in his first 
inaugural address, he praised the American guarantee of free speech, which he viewed as a 
natural right, saying, "If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to 
change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which 




 James Madison also viewed expression as a natural right, and intended copyright to serve 
the public good, as evidenced in The Federalist no. 43.
208
  There, he stated that, "The copy right 
of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at common law. The right to 
useful inventions, seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully 
coincides in both cases..."
209 As a president who had been a drafter of the First Amendment, he 
also wrote in his eighth annual message to Congress that the United States government was one 
"pursuing the public good as its sole object, and regulating its means by the great principles 
consecrated in its charter, ...a government which watches over...freedom of speech..."
210
 He also 
wrote in his detached memoranda that he believed the monopolies granted by copyright ought to 




 Admittedly, the argument can become circular. The First Amendment and the Copyright 
Clause serve the individual who serves the public interest, which serves the individual. James 
Kent wrote of the balance between freedom of the press and the law of libel and slander:  "But 
though the law be solicitous to protect every man in his fair fame and character, it is equally 
careful that the liberty of speech, and of the press, should be duly preserved . . . [this] is deemed 
essential to the judicious exercise of the right of suffrage, and of that control over their rulers, 
which resides in the free people of these United States."
212  
 
 But perhaps Justice Brandeis bolstered the intent of our founders best in his moving 
concurrence in Whitney v. California: 
 
They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means 
 indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech  
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and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily 
adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest  
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty;  
and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They  
recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order  
cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous  
to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression  
breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the  
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the  
fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied  
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force 
in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they  
amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed. 213 
 
 As Justice Brandeis recognized, our forefathers valued freedom of expression as both an 
end and a means. The goal of serving the public good is inextricably tied to the intention of our 
founding fathers when recognizing and protecting intellectual property rights, as is the natural 
right of free speech and dissemination of information. It seems lately that Congress has forgotten 
this goal. But the public good, hand in hand with these natural rights, should be given full due, 
especially when considering copyright or anti-piracy legislation that might endanger freedom of 
speech.  
V. Better Serving the Original Goals of Copyright and the First Amendment 
 Since the United Stated joined the Berne Convention in 1988, Congress has ignored the 
natural right of free speech when enacting copyright legislation. The Supreme Court should use 
standards of review more appropriate for the protection of freedom of expression against this 
advancement in the legislature. The crux of the conflict is the dissonance between the 'natural' 
right theory of intellectual property that is becoming more popular due to compliance with 
international agreements, and our framers' original conception of the public good purpose of 
copyright grants. These two theories of intellectual property can usually be reconciled, but when 
they do come into conflict, courts should construe them to protect the framers' original intent.  
 
 The courts should start by addressing the take-down notice provisions of the DMCA. 
These have not been addressed as content-based prior restraints, even though "they are imposed 
to limit speech before any adjudication on the merits of the copyright claims,"
214 and do so 
arguably based on the content of the posted speech. Prior restraint on speech is a limitation on 
speech before it is published.
215
 Though the DMCA removes the material from publication 
before it has reached its intended audience, the material has already been posted, therefore the 
DMCA take-down notice procedure cannot be technically considered a prior restraint.  
 
 However, the DMCA creates "excessive promotion of self-censorship".
216 This leads to a 
'chilling effect', which like a prior restraint, stops expression before it is made. Also, like a prior 
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restraint, the DMCA restrictions are content-based.
217
 The alternative argument is that the 
government is not restraining a message that an Internet user conveys, only encouraging a 
private actor to censor on private property. But a Congressional act requires these private actors 
to restrain speech based on its content, and courts should realize that this government action 
creates the same type of constitutional problem as overt government censorship. 
 
 By requiring intermediaries to act as judges, juries, and executioners over such vague 
doctrines as 'fair use' and 'definitional balance', especially under the threat of contributory 
infringement, Congress has granted a 'standardless delegation' to these intermediaries, one it 
would not even be allowed to grant to a government agency.
218 Also, Congress has given these 
intermediaries every incentive to restrict speech as opposed to protecting it because of the 
monetary penalties they face as possible contributory infringers.
219   
 
 These intermediaries are made government proxies, who will restrict speech based on 
whatever standard they wish, which is exactly what happened in the case of Senator McCain's 
YouTube videos.
220 This is also akin to what happened in the first days of the English printing 
press, when the Stationers' Company controlled the dissemination of information through the 
Licensing Act.
221
 This nominally private censorship was a direct trigger for the enactment of the 
Statute of Anne, the predecessor of the U.S. Copyright Act, which was intended to end this 
censorship by opening copyright protection to those who were not members of The Company.
222  
 
  In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, the Supreme Court laid down very explicit 
factors in determining whether a government restriction on speech is a prior restraint.
223
 The 
Court held that a provision must be struck down when "the exercise of authority was not 
bounded by precise and clear standards,"
224 which is exactly what happens under the DMCA. It 
required that the restriction be imbedded in a licensing scheme, which copyright is.
225 And it also 
required that the governing body make some determination on whether to grant a license based 
on "'appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion.’"
226 Under the 
DMCA, the intermediary is required to do just this, as it decides whether or not to remove a 
poster's content. So again, the DMCA functions effectively as a prior restraint.  
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 Id at 554, (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940)). 
 
 The danger of a prior restraint on free speech is much greater when the restriction would 
result in a high cost to First Amendment rights (especially when relative to a low cost to a 
copyright owner), when there is too much discretion afforded to the party determining the 
necessity of the restraint, and when possible delay in the dissemination of information could 
result in harm to the public good.
227 In the case of DMCA takedown notices, all of these elements 
are met. And like a prior restraint, "[t]he DMCA deprives the public of both access to speech that 
would ultimately be ruled lawful and the judicial certainty that would come from earlier 




 The DMCA takedown notice procedure has as much 'chilling effect' on free speech as a 
prior restraint, and should be struck down as unconstitutionally restrictive. It incentivizes 
creators to self-censor based on fear of litigation and a sense of uselessness. The courts should 
hold statutes that cause these 'chilling effects' to a higher standard of scrutiny. Our courts should 
also treat as suspect any new legislation enacted under the international copyright agreements, 
which regard intellectual property as a 'natural' right, equivalent to freedom of speech. This 
would better serve the original intent of the framers of our Constitution, by encouraging the 
dissemination of information for the public good.   
Conclusion 
 The Supreme Court is the guardian of our constitutional right to free speech, and this role 
should not, as Congress sometimes may, bow to pressures from entertainment industry 
professionals who seek to limit speech for private economic gain. The underlying problem with 
the recent progression of copyright law is that neither Congress nor the courts have focused on 
the natural, public right to dissemination or the natural right of free speech when considering 
copyright legislation, and instead have focused on the private property concerns and state-
granted rights of copyright holders.  
 
 The DMCA takedown procedure, though technically not a prior restraint, causes such a 
chilling effect on expression that it is arguably unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause. 
Many similar problems exist with other copyright legislation as the DMCA, though it is beyond 
the scope of this article to explore those problems. But when a court encounters conflict 
embodied in such legislation, raised by problems in reconciling international law, it should 
construe the statute to favor the natural right of dissemination of information or the natural right 
to free speech, as would be most harmonious with our framers' original intent. 
 
 There are specific, suspect qualities a court should look for in such legislation. The 
'traditional contours' of copyright are complicated doctrines with difficult, ad-hoc applications, 
especially when imported into the digital age, and should not be used as catch-all saviors to 
defeat infringement claims. A court should be wary if Congress delegates the duty of 
determining the application of these complicated judicial doctrines to private parties. A court 
should also be suspicious should a law criminalize individual copyright infringement, criminalize 
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infringement for non-commercial purposes, levy heavy sanctions for minimal economic loss, or 
shift the burden of proof of innocence significantly onto an alleged infringer. When enacting 
copyright legislation, Congress should consider better protecting First Amendment speech with 
devices such as forced licenses and proper due process, and a court should seriously examine 
whether such legislation is congruent with our framers' original intent.  
 
 The Supreme Court has expressly reserved the right to find an overreaching piece of 
copyright legislation unconstitutionally restrictive. It is time for the Court to begin flexing its 
First Amendment muscles when analyzing these statutes. Perhaps this will encourage Congress 
to remember the purpose of copyright in the United States, which is to encourage free speech and 
the dissemination of ideas in furtherance of individual liberty and public good. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
